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Abstract
This paper analyses the multidimensional aspects of inequality. The paper discusses the concept of
inequality along three types of processes – economic (income, employment and access to physical
assets), social (access to health, education and social security) and political (access to political power
and to legal institutions) -, and three different dimensions – regional, rural/urban and across
population groups (different gender, different ethnicity and different race). The paper examines in
detail the determinants of those types and dimensions of inequality and provides a conceptual
framework for explaining the incidence and persistence of inequalities in Latin America at the levels
described above. This framework is illustrated in two case studies: Brazil and Peru. The paper shows
how inequalities can arise from unequal distribution systems, the existence of different opportunities
and choices for different population groups and forms of discrimination. It is thus argued that an
effective reduction of economic, social and political inequalities in Latin America can only be achieved
via the implementation of a three-tier system of policies that would include (i) the establishment of
progressive tax systems, (ii) the promotion of equal opportunities and (iii) the reduction of
discrimination in all areas of society.
JEL codes:
Keywords: Social inequality, redistribution, developing countries, Brazil, Peru.
April 20031. INTRODUCTION
Although most analyses of inequality in Latin America and elsewhere refer to income
inequality, an important part of the explanation for the persistence of income
inequalities in those countries may lie in the relationship between income inequality
and socio-political structures.
1 The persistence of inequalities due to social exclusion
and the impossibility of certain population groups accessing key social services and
socio-political rights  constitutes a large part of the story of why large income
inequalities persist in Latin America. Although most of the relevant literature refers
solely to income inequality, it is largely acknowledged that income inequality may not
be sufficient for characterising adequately the level of social welfare in a given
society (see Sen, 1997). One problem with this more extensive view of inequality is to
find adequate ways of measuring it given the subjectivity of the concepts involved.
This explains why the measurement of inequality is, in the large majority of the
studies, about the measurement of income inequality and rarely investigates other
aspects of inequality.
2 However, inequalities can arise not only from differences in
incomes, consumption expenditure or assets but also from differences in access to
social institutions such as education, health care and social security, differences in
social legitimacy and social status and differences in political participation, freedom
of association and participation in the process of development in general.
This paper discusses the various dimensions of inequality and analyses their
interactions in two case studies: Brazil and Peru (section 2). Section 3 investigates to
what extent the level and persistence of inequality in Latin America can be explained
by current available theories on the formation of socio-economic structures. Section 4
discusses the role of governments in Latin America in the reduction of persistent
inequalities. The paper concludes by issuing a number of policy recommendations for
the reduction of economic, social and political inequality in Latin America.
                                                
1 See Justino (2001) for similar argument for India.
2 Justino (2003) develops a new methodology for measuring non-income inequalities in developing
countries.2
2. THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL ASPECTS OF INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA
Inequality is a multidimensional phenomenon. Although most studies of inequality
tend to concentrate on the analysis of income inequality, inequalities arise due to other
economic, social and political factors. Some of the most important include:
¤  disparities in employment conditions (between, for instance, skilled and non-
skilled workers),
¤  differences in the access to land and other physical assets,
¤  discrepancies in the use of and access to health, education and other social
services, and
¤  differences in the rights of access to political power (reflected, for instance, in the
membership of labour unions and the exercise of voting rights) and access to legal
institutions.
These various aspects of inequality are of course not homogeneous across society and
are likely to differ between rural and urban areas, between regions and between
different population groups. Disparities between regions and between rural and urban
areas tend to be closely associated with the extent of inequality in a given society. In
most developing countries, urban areas benefit more than rural areas from the
provision of public goods and infrastructure. Furthermore, rural populations tend to
derive their incomes from the agriculture sector and thus be subject to adverse terms
of trade and lower earnings associated with this sector (IFAD, 2001). Inequalities
between different population groups are also usually believed to explain to a large
extent the persistence of poverty and deprivation in developing countries.  Studies
have shown that, for instance, women tend to be paid lower wages than men when
performing similar tasks and households tend to invest less in girls than in boys: girls
are often found to constitute the majority of the illiterate population,
3 and have often
lower levels of nutrition and health than boys in a large number of developing
countries. Race and ethnicity are also important correlates of inequality in most
developing and developed countries (see Justino and Litchfield, 2002). The diagram
below summarises these different aspects of inequality.
                                                



























Groups (gender, ethnicity and race)
Source: Justino (2003).
The aspects of inequality portrayed in the diagram do not take place independently of
each other (Atkinson at al., 2002) and, in many circumstances, they overlap. As such,
it is difficult to compartmentalise the various types and dimensions of inequality in
neat sections. For instance, often land inequality overlaps with inequality between
groups, in particularly between indigenous people and the rest of the population. It
may also overlap with inequality in the access to health and education. Land
inequality is also typically linked to assets inequality, particularly in the access to
credit as inadequate land titling often prevents the use of land as collateral (Herring,
1983). However, although the overlap of the various types and dimensions of
inequality may difficult the empirical analyses of inequality, it emphasises the
complexity of the phenomenon.
This complexity is, however, ill-understood in the literature, largely because it has
been very difficult to combine two important intellectual approaches to the study of
inequality. One the one hand, a large literature has analysed the social, cultural and
political interactions that lead to and explain inequalities without hardly any attempts
at quantification. On the other hand, empirical analyses of inequality tend to overlook
the non-income dimensions of the phenomenon. We do not intend to approach this
issue in depth in this paper.
4 However, in a first attempt to understand the various
                                                
4 See Justino (2002).4
types and dimensions of inequality in Latin America (and elsewhere), we examine
below the extent and interplay between the various types and dimensions of inequality
in the case studies of Brazil and Peru.
2.1. Brazil
Brazil is the largest country in Latin America and one of the countries with perhaps
the largest income inequalities in Latin America and in the world. These coexist with
significant racial differences, not only in terms of income, but also in the access to
important social variables (education, health care and so forth) (Litchfield, 2001;
Woods and  Carvalho, 1988).  Brazil provides thus a good illustration on how
inequalities that derive from unequal distribution systems, unjust opportunities and
discrimination interact across the types (economic, social and political) and the
dimensions (regional, urban/rural and groups) discussed in Justino, Litchfield and
Whitehead (2003). In this section, we illustrate the processes that lead to inequalities
in Brazil by focusing on two dimensions of inequality (racial and regional) and two
types of inequality (health and education inequalities). We hope that this structure will
highlight the complexity of the phenomenon, as well as illustrate the interactions and
overlaps that take place between the different types and dimensions of inequality.
Racial and regional inequalities in Brazil
Brazil has a very diverse population, with a large group of white individuals (mainly
Portuguese descendants), a small African descendant population (mainly descendants
from the slave trade), a large mixed race population and a very small group of
indigenous peoples (Justino and Litchfield, 2002). Mean incomes by racial group in
Brazil vary considerably, with households with African descendants, mixed race or
indigenous heads having significantly lower earnings  than those households with
white or Asian-Brazilian heads. In 1990, households headed by a African descendant,
mixed race or indigenous person received incomes just over half of the national
average. These were around a third of the mean income of households headed by a
white person and around a quarter of households headed by an Asian-Brazilian.
Similar differences persisted in 1995 (Justino and Litchfield, 2002).5
Those economic differences may be related to the extent of racial inequalities in the
Brazilian labour markets. Nascimiento and Nascimiento (2001) (quoted in Justino and
Litchfield, 2002) show that earnings of white men in Brazil are almost two-and-a-half
times higher than those of black men and four times higher than are those of black
women. This illustrates the extent of employment inequalities in Brazil along both
race and gender differences. Job and pay-discrimination are common. For example,
there is evidence that job vacancies in Brazil are advertised expressing the colour
preference of the employer in the belief that different racial groups embody different
work ethics and attributes (Nascimiento  and Nascimiento, 2001, quoted in Justino
and Litchfield, 2002). In addition, African descendants in Brazil have also less access
to safe drinking water, sewage disposal, garbage collection, fridges, televisions and
are more likely to live in rustic accommodation (Nascimiento and Nascimiento, 2001,
Litchfield, 2001). Disparities in law enforcement are also high. Evidence has shown
that, in Brazil, African descendants are more likely to be arrested, suffer from police
abuse and be convicted of crimes (Justino and Litchfield, 2002).
These inequalities are reflected on poverty rates. In Brazil, belonging to either  a
African descendant household or a mixed-race household significantly increases the
probability of an individual being poor, particularly in urban areas (World Bank,
1995). The non-poor in Brazil are predominantly white, whereas the poor are African
descendants or mixed race: over 50% of black and mixed-race households are poor, in
contrast with 25% of households headed by a white person (Justino and Litchfield,
2002).
Given the tendency of the Brazilian surveys to “whiten” the population, the figures
discussed above probably under-estimate of the true extent of differences (Justino and
Litchfield, 2002). The Brazilian surveys ask respondents to choose their “colour”
from five options: branco (white), preto (black), amarelo (yellow)
5, pardo (mixed or
mulatto) and indigena (indigenous). This classification has led some to argue that the
Brazilian population is statistically “whitened” (Justino and Litchfield, 2002). For
example, Guimaraes (2001) shows that when faced with the above classification, a
large proportion of respondents declare themselves to be “white”. However, when
                                                
5 This rather derogatory term refers to migrants and their descendants from Asia.6
asked to classify their own colour, very few individuals answered “white” but many
more said moreno, which embodies a large range of skin colour, from very dark black
to very light  mestizos (Justino and Litchfield, 2002). This problem has been
emphasised by the fact that questions relating to race and colour were removed from
the 1970 Brazilian Census and national household surveys failed to collect data on
race until the late 1980s (Guimaraes, 2001 and Roland, 2001).
Inequalities in Brazil take place not only across different population groups but also
across a regional dimension. Regional inequalities in Brazil are well documented (see
Azzoni, Menezes-Filho, de Menezes and Silveira-Neto, 2000). In 1960, Brazil had a
GDP per capita of US$1,449. Thirty-five years later, in 1995, this figure had risen to
US$3,556, corresponding to an average growth rate of 2.6% per year. Data on per
capita GDP for Brazilian states in 1995 show, however, that only five Brazilian states
had figures above the national average, namely, São Paulo (whose GDP per capita
was twice the national average), Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Parana and Santa
Catarina. The poorest state was Piauí, with a GDP per capita that was 3.7 times less
than the Brazilian average, and 6.1 times less than that of the state of São Paulo
(Azzoni, Menezes-Filho, de Menezes and Silveira-Neto, 2000). Regional inequalities
in Brazil originate from a strong north-south divide. Eight out of the ten poorest states
in Brazil were in the Northeast, and three of the four states of the Southeast were
among the five richest states in Brazil ( Azzoni,  Menezes-Filho, de  Menezes and
Silveira-Neto, 2000). These inequalities may be explained by geographical
characteristics such as climate and differences in public and private investment in
infrastructure. Such differences will impact on the growth rates of states or regions by
influencing the productivity of individual or family capital. For instance, after
controlling for differences in the provision of garbage collection services (a close
proxy for access to infrastructure and social services), income inequality among those
regions drops to 36%, from the previous 82% (Azzoni, Menezes-Filho, de Menezes
and Silveira-Neto, 2000).
Health and education inequalities in Brazil7
Social inequalities are extremely high in Brazil, both in the access to health and
education. For instance, life expectancy is shorter among blacks than whites by
around seven years, and infant mortality rates are almost double among blacks. Health
inequalities in Brazil are made worse by the existence of a two-tiered system of
healthcare (Alves and Timmins, 2001). Better-off households and individuals whose
employers provide health coverage, have access to a private system of healthcare that
provides high quality treatment. The rest of the population relies on a system of public
clinics and hospitals, characterised by long waiting times and disputable quality. This
constitutes effectively a mechanism of social exclusion of the poor, the elderly, the
rural population, African descendants and mixed-race Brazilians, which implies that
those who are forced to rely on the system spend more time being sick and,
subsequently, have a diminished health stock (Alves and Timmins, 2001). While the
state is meant to provide universal healthcare in Brazil, state expenditures on
healthcare represent only about 4.2% of GNP each year, a figure lower than the
12.7%, 9% and 6% of its GNP the US, France and El Salvador, respectively, allocate
to health. This low level of spending has led to many questions about the quality of
publicly provided healthcare in Brazil. Less than $80 per capita was spent on
healthcare in Brazil in 2002, whereas the corresponding per capita expenditure in
Argentina was around $300 and in the US, $2,300. Almost $16 billion was spent on
health care in 1995, of which $2.7 billion was used to pay staff and $2.9 billion was
used to cover old loans ( Alves and  Timmins, 2001). This low level of spending
highlights doubts regarding the quality of public health care in Brazil. In addition,
there are huge income disparities in the Brazil health care: 35 million of the 120
million Brazilians without private health insurance are below the poverty line (Alves
and Timmins, 2001). Inequalities in the Brazilian health system are likely to increase
further due to expected raises in the price of this form of healthcare in the coming
decades. Groups such as the poor, African descendants, indigenous people, the elderly
and rural populations are expected to suffer disproportionately because of their
inability to switch to private health coverage (Alves and Tummins, 2001).
Health inequalities in Brazil have not only a strong race component but also reflect
significant regional divides, which, again, highlights the overlap between types and
dimensions of inequality in the country.  Alves,  Carvalheiro and  Heimann (2000)8
(quoted in  Alves and  Timmins, 2001) show that, in the state of  São Paulo, 48.9
percent of the health services used in 1998 were paid by the SUS (Sistema Unico de
Saude, or Unified Health System), 6% were paid directly by the users and 45.1% of
the health services were pre-paid. Among the total population of the state of São
Paulo, 44.2 percent have some type of health insurance coverage, while 55.8 percent
have none. Those without private health insurance coverage have to rely entirely on
the SUS. In the rest of Brazil, over 50 percent of the population relies on this public
health system (Alves and Tummins, 2001).
Similarly to health, inequality in education is very high in Brazil. Education
inequalities also take place along racial dimensions. African descendants have just
two-thirds the level of education of the white population and one quarter of them have
no schooling at all. Furthermore, African Brazilians who graduate from high school
have about half the chance of white students to go on to university, as a result of
poorer attainment in maths and science (Justino and Litchfield, 2002). The system of
education is so skewed in favour of better-off households that only those able to
afford private tuition at school can hope to gain access to the publicly funded
universities (Justino and Litchfield, 2002).
In addition, returns to education in Brazil have increased drastically between 1976 and
1996 (Kanbur and Lustig, 1999). This was particularly significant for higher levels of
education (table 1), which reflects an increase in inequalities between those with
lower levels of education and those with higher qualifications.
TABLE 1 – RETURNS TO EDUCATION IN BRAZIL IN THE 1990S











1992 0.12 0.26 0.47 0.84 1.54
1993 0.10 0.24 0.47 0.82 1.50
1995 0.45 0.82 1.17 1.72 2.50
1996 0.41 0.76 1.13 1.65 2.39
Source: Attanasio and Székely (1999), pp. 43.
However, signs of a decrease in education inequalities are visible even if small.
Increased returns to higher levels of education have been offset by an increase in the9
average years of schooling in Brazil from 3.8 in 1976 to 5.9 in 1996, which has
equalised the effects of educational achievements on individual earnings and
household per capita incomes (Kanbur and Lustig, 1999). The inequality effect of
increasing returns to education was also offset by the contribution of higher levels of
schooling (particularly by women) to a decrease in household size, particularly of
poor households and the reduction in the variance of returns to ‘unobserved’
characteristics (Kanbur and Lustig, 1999).
The case study of Brazil illustrates clearly that inequality is a complex phenomenon,
where different types and dimensions intertwine. The example of Brazil shows, in
particular, a large interaction between group inequalities – between the white
population and those of African descendance and between the poor and the non-poor
– regional inequalities, and social inequalities.
2.2. Peru
The various aspects of inequality in Peru are not as well documented as in Brazil.
However, this case study illustrates important aspects of inequality in developing
countries, namely the overlap between ethnic inequalities, land inequality and
inequality in legal rights.
One of the most important dimensions of inequality in Peru is ethnicity. In Peru, the
national average illiteracy rate is 13%. However, it reaches 33% amongst the
indigenous population and it increases to 44% in the case of indigenous women
(Social Watch, 1999). Literacy, school attendance and attainment rates are much
lower than national averages in regions where indigenous peoples are concentrated
(Bejar, 1998). While the ethnic and cultural plurality of the nation is recognised in the
Peruvian Constitution, the ILO conventions  regarding consultation, self–
determination and education are not enforced (Social Watch, 1999). Peru recognises
both Spanish and ethnic languages as official. However, ethnic languages are only
recognised in the zones where indigenous populations predominate. This constitutes
effectively a mechanism of exclusion of indigenous people from employment and
access to social services and are a serious impediment to indigenous families moving
to other rural and urban areas where they cannot use their own language.10
An important cause of marginalisation of indigenous and ethnic groups in Peru (and
elsewhere in the developing world) lies in land distribution.
6 As discussed in Justino,
Litchfield and Whitehead (2003), Peru has the highest land Gini coefficients in all
Latin America. This arises partially from the fact that, although the state of Peru
recognises that all people have the right to an ethnic and cultural identity and that the
State has the obligation to recognise and protect the nation’s ethnic and cultural
plurality (Social Watch, 1999), it does not guarantee the right to land tenure and has
contributed towards making land ownership precarious (Social Watch, 1999). The
1993 Constitution established that the common lands of rural communities
(previously untouchable) could be embargoed, bought, sold or split into parcels. In
1995, the Law for the Promotion of Private Investment in Economic Activities on
National Land and that of Rural Communities established that common rural lands
could be acquired by third parties by simple occupation or possession when left
empty. This has created widespread injustices against minority ethnic communities.
For instance, the Quechua and Aymara sometimes leave their lands empty when using
crop rotation systems of land cultivation. However, this puts them in danger of having
their land occupied. On the other hand, violence against some groups within the
Ashaninka communities has forced many families to abandon their plots of land. The
courts of law have not upheld the rights of indigenous people to their land since they
do not recognise crop rotation and other similar explanations as valid (Bejar, 1998).
This constitutes a serious breach in the rights of indigenous populations to use
traditional methods of agriculture, as well as constituting a serious form of inequality
in legal protection. Furthermore, the economic model currently being applied in Peru
promotes the sale of natural resources. This has allowed private companies to use
common lands without consulting communities and without paying the benefits due
them. For instance, the 1993 Hydrocarbons Law has no provisions to protect
indigenous peoples' rights to the lands and forests they occupy, which particularly
threatens the Amazon communities (Bejar, 1998; see also Social Watch, 1999 and
Bejar, 2000).
                                                
6 What follows draws on Justino and Litchfield (2002).11
This situation naturally reflects on levels of poverty in Peru (Ruggeri Laderchi, 1999;
Justino and Litchfield, 2002). In Peru,  individuals belonging to households where
Spanish is not the first language of the head form 24% of the country’s poor, but only
16% of the total population. 86% of households whose head speaks Aymara (one of
several indigenous languages) are poor, compared to a poverty rate of 42% among
Spanish-speakers (see table 2 in section 2). The poorest areas in Peru coincide with
areas inhabited by ethnic minorities and indigenous groups (rural areas, mountainous
areas, the Amazon and some coastal rural areas). In 1994, the urban population
consumed 2,590 calories and 69 grams of protein per day compared with 2,812
calories and 74 grams of protein in rural areas. However, the group of families living
in extreme poverty in the urban and rural hill areas and in the rural coast (where
numerous indigenous families are found) consumed less than 30% of their nutrient
requirements (Haak and O’Brien, 1997). Furthermore, the indigenous peoples of the
Amazon have the highest levels of poverty in the country: 59.48% of the indigenous
forest peoples are poor and 41% live in absolute poverty (Justino and Litchfield,
2002).
Inequalities will thus not be reduced in Peru until the government recognises and
intervenes in the widespread discrimination of minority ethnic groups.
3. DETERMINANTS OF PERSISTENT INEQUALITY
The extent and perseverance of economic, social and political inequalities in Latin
America leads to the following questions: Why do these inequalities arise? And why
do they persist? These are particularly important questions to ask in the context of
Latin America, where severe inequalities have, as illustrated by the two case studies
above, remained unchanged throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, despite increases
in economic growth and the reduction of poverty in several countries in the region.
Inequalities arise due to the existence of unequal distribution systems in society. They
also arise because different individuals face different opportunities and choices.
Finally, forms of discrimination inherent to the various societies (defined by historical
processes or otherwise) may also contribute towards the emergence of economic,12
social and political inequalities (Justino, 2003). The figure below illustrates this

















The absence of systematic actions against those three factors explains, in turn, why
inequalities persist across time in Latin America and elsewhere. In Latin America, the
lack of action against inequalities that arise from unjust distributional systems,
differences in initial opportunities and discrimination is made worse by the influence
of interest groups and the existence of relatively high levels of tolerance for inequality
in the region. These issues are analysed in further detail in the sections that follow.
2.1. Unjust distributional systems
Most tax systems in developing countries are not progressive (Killick, 2002). In a
survey of tax incidence in a sample of 20 developing and in transition countries, Chu
at al. (2000) find that tax systems were progressive in just over a third of cases. About
a fifth of all cases were regressive and the remainder neutral. This results from the
fact that implementing progressive tax systems in developing countries is very
difficult, given the existence of weak governments, influenced by elites and affected
by corruption, the persistence of high tax evasion and the existence of very small
taxable income bases.13
Most Latin American countries face a combination of insufficient tax resources and
uneven tax systems (Shome, 1999; Tanzi, 2000). Table 2 shows the average minimum
and maximum rates of personal and corporate income taxes (as a percentage of
taxable income and taxable profits, respectively) in Latin America and the OECD.
TABLE 2 – PERSONAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE OECD
Latin America OECD
Personal Income Tax Rates
     1985-86 7.0 – 49.9 22.0 – 52.8
     1991 5.9 – 38.1 15.9 – 44.6
     1997 8.7 – 34.2 15.0 – 43.6
Corporate Income Tax Rates
     1986 3.4 – 43.3 28.7 – 42.8
     1992 8.6 – 36.5 21.5 – 37.3
     1997 23.3 – 27.6 22.4 – 33.5
Source: Shome, P. (1999), pp. 5 and 8.
The table shows that, while bottom tax rates (both personal and corporate) decreased
in 1991 (1992) only to increase again in 1997, top tax rates have decreased steadily in
Latin America, particularly in the case of corporate taxes. This trend is likely to be
closely related to the process of globalisation Latin American economies have
experienced since the early 1990s and reflects difficulties in taxing factors of
production that are internationally mobile (Shome, 1999). The increase in the bottom
rates, accompanied by a decrease in the top tax rates illustrates the unevenness of
Latin America’s tax system.
7 Table 2 shows further that both personal income tax
rates and corporate income tax rates are, on average, lower in Latin American
countries than in OECD countries, which suggests that Latin American countries
benefit, on average, from lower tax revenues than OECD economies.
Macroeconomic crises, high inflation and political opposition explain, to a very large
extent, why governments in Latin America have a limited capacity to collect taxes.
Tax evasion and delays of payments are quite high in developing countries (Newbery
and Stern, 1987, part 2) – including most Latin American countries - given in part that
it is very difficult if not impossible to directly tax high income classes in those
                                                
7 Note that bottom rates, especially those of personal income taxes, have decreased in OECD countries
during the same period.14
countries (see Newbery and Stern, 1987; Justino, 2001). First, a large fraction of the
incomes of the rich in developing countries comes from capital, which is
internationally mobile. Thus, an increase in capital taxes to finance social security
programmes may simply lead to capital flight. Second, their income is often derived
from entrepreneurial activities, which are hard to record in developing countries and
thus difficult to tax. Third, the rich are often powerful and tend to dominate the
process of policy design by making sure that their interests prevail. As argued by
Radian (1980), “Political feasibility is limited by the dominance of a small number of
business interests. It is difficult to impose a heavy burden on the poor because they
have little to give up; it is even harder to impose it on the rich because they are the
most politically influential” (pp. 58).
The extent of poverty and the need for social protection policies in most of the region
imply, however, that Latin American governments desperately need not only to
increase tax revenues (in order to maintain and/or increase social protection policies)
but also to design progressive tax systems whereby the poor benefit from a transfer of
resources from the rich. In order to address this issue, some Latin American
governments have implemented novel tax initiatives.  Some of the most important
were the setting up of gross asset taxes (essentially a minimum tax on enterprises’
assets that force companies to use their assets productively and do not avoid evasion
on profit taxes), taxes on bank debits (introduced in Colombia to make up for lost
revenues when value-added tax rates were reduced and in Ecuador to replace income
taxes) and the simplification of taxes for small tax payers (Tanzi, 2000). Other tax
initiatives being pursued include value-added taxes (VAT) and excise taxes which
replace the old tariffs and export taxes on traded goods (see table 3 below). Although
changes in excises have not been very pronounced, most Latin American countries
represented in table 3 have experienced significant increases in VAT, sales taxes and
turnover taxes. These have been accompanied in most cases by a decrease in income
taxes, in, in the whole, are more difficult to collect.15
TABLE 3 – CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAXES TO GDP RATIOS IN SELECTED LATIN


















     1992 1.1 4.3 0.4 5.9 2.1 0.9 1.3
     1996 2.3 3.8 0.2 6.4 1.3 0.7 0.3
Bolivia
     1992 0.5 2.0 1.0 4.0 0.9 1.3 1.4
     1996 1.6 2.5 0.9 4.5 1.0 1.2 1.9
Brazil
     19921 4.4 5.1 - 12.4 - 0.6 -
     1996 4.1 5.4 - 9.5 - 0.6 -
Chile
     1992 6.0 1.6 0.1 8.5 1.9 2.1 -
     1996 5.2 1.4 0.1 8.8 1.9 2.1 -
Colombia
     1992 5.2 2.2 - 4.0 0.8 1.1 0.8
     1996 4.3 3.7 - 5.3 0.7 1.0 1.1
Guatemala
     1992 1.9 - 0.1 2.6 1.1 2.1 0.5
     1996 1.6 - 0.6 3.7 0.9 1.5 0.5
Mexico
     1992 5.1 2.3 - 2.7 1.6 1.1 0.5
     1996 3.9 1.8 - 2.9 1.2 0.6 0.4
Nicaragua
     1992 3.3 3.5 0.7 3.2 8.4 4.0 0.0
     1996 3.1 3.7 0.0 4.7 8.3 4.7 0.0
Peru
     1992 1.7 1.8 0.4 3.2 1.2 1.1 0.3
     1996 3.4 1.6 0.0 5.0 0.8 1.5 0.4
Source: Shome, P. (1999), pp. 14.
Notes: 1. Includes state-level VAT.
Although the introduction of these tax initiatives has had varied degrees of success
(see  Tanzi, 2000), it constitutes a step in the right direction. Despite significant
improvements, tax systems in most Latin American countries are, however, still
characterised by a lack of professionalism and high levels of corruption amongst tax
officials and governed by political interests. This, in turn, hinders the successful
implementation of progressive and efficient systems. Solutions to address some of the
problems will, of course, be country-specific and depend on the particular needs of
each economy. A large literature has issued viable recommendations for various
countries (see Jenkins, 1995; Shome, 1999). Although we will not address this issue
in this paper, we must add that the successful implementation of progressive tax
systems will be an important factor in the reduction of economic, social and political16
inequalities in the whole Latin America region and should be high in the agenda of the
respective governments.
2.2. Initial opportunities
Inequalities will arise when people face different opportunities. These are often
determined by family relations and surrounding social environments (social capital).
For instance, in Latin America, labour markets are often characterised by high returns
to schooling, when compared to the US and other developed countries. This has led to
a high differentiation between those that can access higher levels of education and
better schools and those that cannot. Lam and Levison (1992) (quoted in Lam and
Schoeni, 1993) estimate that education alone explains 50% of the variation of
earnings of 30 to 33 year old males in Brazil. The same value for the US is 10%. One
explanation for this is the existence of high rents due to the relative scarcity of human
capital. This argument is particularly relevant to Brazil, where a high degree of
industrialisation coexists with low degrees of schooling (less than 5 years on average)
(Lam and Schoeni, 1993). Critics have however suggested that this could also reflect
other factors such as family and community connections. Although Lam and Schoeni
(1993) do not find very significant empirical evidence of this in Brazil, the hypothesis
has been upheld for Latin America in general (Dahan and Gaviria, 1999), Panama
(Hackman and  Hotz, 1986), Nicaragua ( Behrman and Wolfe, 1984) and Mexico
(Binder and Woodruff, 1999; Kanbur and Lustig, 1999).
The issue of intergenerational mobility (i.e. how different generations move along the
income and social strata) has been extensively analysed by social scientists and, for a
long time, it was dominated by a debate between liberal theories of industrialisation
and Marxist theories (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). The liberal theories argue that
industrial societies are characterised by a commitment to technical and economic
rationality and therefore promote high and increasing rates of social mobility and
equality of opportunity as the process of social selection becomes more rational
(Piketty, 1998). On the other hand, Marxist theories are based on the premise that
capitalists societies are characterised by class reproduction, whereby a small number
of capitalist dynasties reproduce themselves from generation to generation and a large
and growing number of working class dynasties are exploited by capitalist dynasties17
generation after generation (Piketty, 1998). Sociologists have found, however, that
there has been no significant change in mobility rates over time in developed societies
since the second World War. Recent economics studies based on newly available
panel data have confirmed these results.
8 Intergenerational mobility rates in Latin
America also have not changed a lot and have remained quite low during the last
decades. This indicates that different generations of the same family tend to remain in
the same social and economic stratum, which suggests that inequalities will be
determined to a large extent by family connections.
There is a large literature on intergenerational transmission of inequality (see Piketty,
1998). Inequality can be transmitted through family relations via several means. One
is through wealth inheritances. Thus, if credit markets are imperfect, dynasties with
little initial wealth face limited investment opportunities and remain poor. This makes
consumption inequality and earnings differentials more persistent across generations
(Piketty, 1998). Other means include the transmission of productive abilities and
efficient human capital investments across generations, as well as family transmission
of ambition and other tastes that are conducive to high productive ability (Piketty,
1998). The literature refers also to the issue of positive assorting mating: “if children’s
abilities depend on the characteristics of both parents, then the fact that men and
women with similar characteristics tend to mate together makes intergenerational
mobility lower than it would be under random matching” (Piketty, 1998: 48).
The intergenerational transmission of inequality is quite high in Latin America. Dahan
and Gaviria (1998) find that families tend to accentuate (rather than attenuate) overall
inequality of income and earnings. In a later paper, Dahan and Gaviria (1999) use
sibling correlations in schooling to measure differences in intergenerational mobility.
They argue that if there is perfect social mobility, family background would not
matter and siblings would behave as two random people chosen from the total
population. If, on the other hand, family background matters, then siblings would
behave in a similar fashion. They find that intergenerational mobility is quite low in
Latin America, which registers a coefficient of 0.49 (indicating that siblings behave
quite similarly), against a coefficient of 0.20 for the US (table 4).
                                                
8 See Piketty (1998) for a detailed examination of empirical evidence available.18












Argentina 1996 0.437 2.18 2098 10.0 0.26
Bolivia 1997 0.561 2.14 647 8.6 0.35
Brazil 1996 0.531 2.20 5906 6.4 0.49
Chile 1996 0.435 2.12 1801 9.6 0.25
Colombia 1997 0.587 2.18 2426 8.1 0.38
Costa Rica 1995 0.340 2.18 679 7.7 0.36
Ecuador 1995 0.577 2.19 506 8.4 0.35
Mexico 1996 0.594 2.21 1352 8.4 0.38
Nicaragua 1993 0.576 2.23 442 5.5 0.66
Panama 1997 0.480 2.18 565 8.9 0.32
Peru 1997 0.385 2.17 377 9.3 0.27
Paraguay 1995 0.423 2.13 279 7.4 0.41
El Salvador 1995 0.599 2.17 791 6.9 0.55
Uruguay 1995 0.418 2.15 863 9.7 0.25
Venezuela 1995 0.438 2.20 1737 8.6 0.32
Average 0.490 2.18 1307 8.3 0.37
USA 1996 0.203 2.10 1214 11.0 0.17
Source: Dahan and Gaviria (1999), pp. 29.
Notes: The correlation index indicates the degree of social mobility in society. Zero indicates perfect
social mobility, whereas one indicates no mobility.
Attanasio and  Székely (1999) provide further evidence for intergenerational
transmission of inequalities in Latin America. They find that child’s attainment in
school (average number of years spent in school) and family education are strongly
positively correlated (the coefficient for mother’s schooling is stronger  than the
father’s). This is likely to be explained by the fact that more educated parents put
more input into their children’s education. Alternatively, less educated parents may
face financial difficulties that prevents them from borrowing the funds necessary to
see their children through a certain number of years of school (Attanasio and Székely,
1999). In order to investigate these two hypotheses, they look at household surveys
for Bolivia, Costa Rica, Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay and Venezuela. These
household surveys ask children and young adults not enrolled in school why they are
not attending school. Attanasio and Székely estimate that around 25% of all 21 year
olds from the first quintile (bottom 20% of the income distribution) to which the
question is posed answer that they are not enrolled in school because they lack the
necessary resources, while 17.8% do not attend because they are working. Amongst
those in the top decile of the income distribution, only 9% give lack of financial
resources as the reason why they are not in school.19
Another way where family background may influence the educational achievement of
various population groups and generate unequal initial opportunities for different
individuals is the quality of schools. In general, poorer children tend to attend lower
scoring schools than children from better-off families. This allied with better family
connections and larger initial wealth of children from richer families further
contributes towards the deepening of inequalities along all types and dimensions and
across generations.
Other social relations may equally explain the emergence of inequalities in society
due to the access to different initial opportunities and choices. One example is local
segregation into unequal communities. Cutler and Glaeser (1997) (quoted in Piketty,
1998) find that a one standard deviation decrease in segregation would eliminate one-
third of the black-white differential in schooling and employment outcomes in the US.
Bénabou (1993) examines the effect of likelihood of the possibility that public goods
and educational opportunity are greater in richer neighbourhood than in the poorer
neighbourhoods.
9 The lower cost of acquisition of human capital in a given area is an
incentive factor that, combined with higher wages for skilled labour, induces the
bidding up land prices which, in turn, keeps out lower income groups. As segregation
is practised by upper-income groups, the cost of acquisition of human capital rises in
poorer neighbourhood due both to deterioration of public goods and the depletion of
spill-over effect arising out of a pool of skilled labour. Other econometric studies
have, furthermore, suggested, though not definitively, that neighbourhood
characteristics, such as average educational level of the adults contribute to poverty
inducing factors, such as teenage pregnancy and low-level schooling achievement
among the young ( Durlauf, 2000).  Molina,  Rada and  Jiménez (2002) find that
individual and neighbourhood-level interactions between ethnicity and segregation in
Bolivia are significantly and negatively correlated with income and schooling
attainment.
Skill segregation at the firm level can also contribute to the emergence of inequalities
amongst different workers and to more persistent inequalities. This is because higher
                                                
9 See also Borjas (1999).20
human capital inequality can increase the incentives of high-skill workers to separate
themselves from low-skill workers and to work together.
In addition to neighbourhood segregation effects and skill segregation, Wilson (1987)
(quoted in Piketty, 1998) argues that residential segregation may contribute towards
labour market discriminations and, consequently, to differences in initial opportunities
between those individuals that live in better areas and those that live in less desirable
residential districts: “if employers can more easily associate a particular set of would-
be employees to a specific, disadvantaged neighbourhood, then self-fulfilling
discriminatory beliefs can more easily develop” (pp. 52). Furthermore, because
“credit constraints also tend to make residential segregation more likely, this means
that credit imperfections, local segregation and discrimination can operate together
and lead to a cumulative process of socially-inefficient persistent inequality” (Piketty,
1998: 52).
2.3. Forms of discrimination
The existence of discrimination in Latin America societies against specific racial,
ethnical or religious groups is a sensitive issue and one that is difficult to prove.
However, a large literature has shown that indigenous people and individuals of
African descendence have higher levels of poverty and worse access to social services
and political institutions than the rest of the population.
10 This situation has been in
place for a large period of time and has probably been highly influenced by the
colonial history of Latin America and the segregation that was established then by the
white Spanish settlers (Portuguese in Brazil) and indigenous populations and the
slaves brought over from Africa.
It is difficult to prove that inequalities between population groups and the exclusion of
some groups from the access to social, economic and political institutions are a result
of discrimination. Although it is easy to understand how inequalities can derive from
implicit or explicit discrimination against some groups, causality may be difficult to
                                                
10 See Justino and Litchfield (2002) for a review of this evidence. This is also discussed in further detail
in Justino, Litchfield and Whitehead (2003).21
establish as some forms of discrimination can take subtle expressions (Justino and
Litchfield, 2002).  We can nevertheless deduce causality from the fact that ( i)
exclusion and poverty are higher among some population groups such as minority
ethnic groups, certain races and women and (ii) inequalities between these groups and
the rest of the population tend to persist and/or become worse over time (see table 5
below).
11 Table 5 illustrates one important dimension of discrimination in Latin
America: that against indigenous populations. The table shows that despite
constituting a relatively small proportion of the population, an extraordinarily high
fraction of individuals classified as indigenous peoples find themselves below the
poverty line.
TABLE 5 - GROUP INEQUALITIES IN LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES)







Peru 24  65*
Source: Based on information discussed in Justino and Litchfield (2002).
Notes: *This value raises to 86% if we consider only the Aymara speakers.
One way in which such segregation can result in persistent inequalities is through
what the literature refers to as ‘self-fulfilling beliefs’. Persistent inequality through
self-fulfilling beliefs derive from the fact that lower classes internalise that they will
not be able to climb the social ladder and therefore assume behaviours that will keep
then at the bottom of the distribution (Bourdieu). Thus reducing persistent inequalities
does not have necessarily to be only about fiscal redistribution but, more importantly
in the case of discrimination, should be about modifying social attitudes (Piketty,
1998).
12 Inequality between two social groups with homogeneous characteristics
generated from self-fulfilling beliefs, “can make the inequality between social groups
                                                
11 Further evidence is discussed in Justino, Litchfield and Whitehead (2003) and in section 5 for Brazil
and Peru.
12 See also Akerlof and Kranton (2000) who explores how to incorporate identity into economic models
of behaviour and thus explain the formation of identity-based preferences. As he argues, “In a world of
social difference, one of the most important economic decisions that an individual makes may be the
type of person to be. Limits on this choice would also be critical determinants of economic bahavior,
opportunity, and well-being” (pp. 748).22
with initially characteristics more persistent than it would otherwise be” ( Piketty,
1998: 51).
2.4. The influence of interest groups
Political and social policy decisions in Latin America are more often than not
determined by the interests of elites. Powerful families and larger enterprises have a
considerable influence on government policies in Latin America, which guarantees
the protection of their own social and economic interests. This influence has had high
costs for the rest of the population.
Tilly’s (1998) work was one of the first theoretical efforts to systematically analyse
the persistence of inequalities caused by differences between societal categories.
Persistent or ‘durable’ inequalities (to use  Tilly’s terminology) between different
social or political categories arise “because people who control access to value-
producing resources solve pressing organizational problems by means of categorical
distinctions. Inadvertently or otherwise, those people set up systems of social closure,
exclusion, and control” (pp. 8). These inequalities often persist despite the process of
industrialisation and modernisation and changes in the government and society
towards the integration of the various groups in the structures of employment and
organisation of the civil society. Tilly’s concept of “categorical inequality” is central
to explaining durable inequalities:
13 “Categories support durable inequality when they
combine with hierarchies - ties between social sites in which the connections are
asymmetrical and the sites systematically unequal. Each reinforces the other, for a
relatively impermeable barrier reduces the likelihood that equalizing relations based
on unequal resources justify the boundary and render it more visible” (Tilly, 1998:
72).
The notion of ‘categorical inequalities’ is somewhat similar to Frances Stewart’s
concept of ‘horizontal inequalities’. Frances Stewart’s work has played an important
role in the understanding of inequalities by focusing not on individuals, as most
                                                
13 Tilly makes an important distinction between inequalities that can be expressed along a continuous
dimension ([tall ... short]; [rich ... poor]; etc) and inequalities that arise from the division of society in
categories (male/female; aristocrat/plebeian; citizen/foreigner; religious affiliation; ethnic origin, etc)23
conventional analyses, but rather on groups. As argued in Stewart (2002), “An
intrinsic part of human life is group membership – in fact it is this that makes up the
identity (or multiple identities) of individuals – their family affiliations, cultural
affinities, and so on” (pp. 2). Inequalities between groups – i.e. horizontal inequalities
– constitute thus an important dimension of development, as they may have important
social and political consequences, particularly when group identity is strong and
mobility between groups is low.  The notion of “horizontal inequalities” between
“groups” is particularly relevant to explain the emergence of political conflicts of the
type analysed in Justino, Litchfield and Whitehead (2003) and even civil wars: “Civil
wars occur when groups mobilise against each other; their leaders use ethnicity or
some other characteristic like religion, to unite and mobilise the group. Such
mobilisation is effective where there are substantial horizontal inequalities [my italic],
i. e. inequalities among groups, which cause resentment” (Stewart, 2000: 1).
The group (or categorical) dimension of inequality is very important in the context of
Latin America. The evidence discussed in Justino, Litchfield and Whitehead (2003)
clearly shows that some of the most important dimensions of inequality that typically
take place in Latin America result from economic, social and political differences
between males and females, between indigenous people and the rest of the population,
between African descendants and the white population and between the poor and the
non-poor. Family connections, segregation of neighbourhoods and discrimination are
strong mechanisms through which those group inequalities not only arise but also
persist across time. In Latin America, across different racial, ethnic and religious
groups are high and are kept high through the low levels of intergenerational mobility
and high levels of segregation and discrimination discussed in the previous section.
Persistent inequalities between different population groups in Latin America have
created unfair situations, where some groups benefit from access to good schools and
better health care and have a high political influence, whereas others suffer from
serious deprivation. This has, in turn, generated social and political instability in many
Latin American countries.
14
                                                
14 As discussed extensively in Justino, Litchfield and Whitehead (2003), crime, violence and political
instability are quite high across most of Latin America.24
2.5. Tolerance for inequality
The persistence of inequalities depends not only on the actions resulting from the
pressure of elites, segregation of different groups and discrimination, but can to a
certain extent also result from the level of tolerance for inequalities that exists in each
society, as argued by Hirschman (1981). Hirschman provides a useful framework to
explain the persistence of inequalities in a given society, by using an analogy referred
to as the “tunnel effect”. He explains this important effect in the following way: “An
individual’s welfare depends on his present state of contentment (or, as a proxy,
income), as well as on his expected future contentment (or income). Suppose that the
individual has very little information about his future income, but at some point a few
of his relatives,  neighbors, or acquaintances improve their economic or social
position. Now he has something to go on: expecting that his turn will come in due
course, he will draw gratification from the advances of others - for a while. It will be
helpful to refer to this initial gratification as the “tunnel effect” (pp. 40-41). Thus,
while the “tunnel effect” is in place, society will have a relatively high tolerance for
economic, social and political disparities. Furthermore, while the “tunnel effect” is in
operation, the two important developmental tasks of growth and equity can be solved
sequentially. This is because everyone perceives themselves as better-off and thus
“some uneven distribution of the new incomes generated by growth will be preferred
to an egalitarian distribution by all members of the society” (pp. 43). Therefore,
income inequality that arises from the process of economic growth would not only be
“politically tolerable” but also “outright desirable from the point of view of social
welfare” (pp. 43).
In societies where the “tunnel effect” is not in operation, in societies where the
“tunnel effect” ceases to operate, or in societies that have not in place the needed
institutions to cope with the simultaneous establishment of growth and equity, “there
is bound to be trouble and, perhaps, disaster” (pp. 40). This “disaster” is what Ted
Gurr refers to as the “actualization [of discontent] in violent action against political
objects and actors” (Gurr, 1970: 13). Hirschman refers to two types of development
“disasters”.  The first type is illustrated by the development strategies followed in
Nigeria and Pakistan, countries that “have attempted to develop by means of a
strategy implying the arising of new inequalities or the widening of old ones” (pp.25
57), in the context of societies that did not have in place the "tunnel effect"
mechanism to begin with. The second type of development “disaster” is that typical of
some Latin American countries. One is the authoritarian regime installed in Brazil in
1964. The other is the student massacre in Mexico in 1968), where “ruling groups and
policymakers fail to realize that the safety valve, which the [tunnel] effect implies,
will cease to operate after some time” (pp. 57).
Many Latin American countries face an interesting paradox (which is analysed in
detail in Acharya, Schneider and Ugaz, 2003): despite the discontent with the levels of
economic, social and political inequality, there has been little demand for
redistributive policies that directly address those policies. In fact, in many cases, the
population has democratically elected governments known for their little concern for
redistribution (Acharya, Schneider and Ugaz, 2003). High levels of inequality have,
nonetheless, deemed to be “politically tolerable”, even if undesirable, because other
variables such as security and fiscal stabilisation cancelled out the significance of
more extensive redistribution. The concern of the civil society in Latin America for
issues other than redistribution have cemented a high tolerance for inequality in most
Latin America. In addition to the persistence of unjust distributional systems,
differences in initial opportunities, segregation and discrimination and the vested
interests of elites, a relatively high tolerance for inequality in Latin America explains
to a large extent the persistence of economic, social and political inequalities in the
region.
4. THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT
The persistence of inequalities in Latin America also on the level of involvement of
the government into the process of reducing inequalities. Evidence has shown that
inequality in Latin America is largely dysfunctional
15 and originates from the lack of
opportunities for large segments of the population and the “outright (or implicit)
exclusion of some groups on the basis of their gender, ethnic origin, place of
                                                
15 I.e. arises from political connections and other forms of discrimination, from a colonial legacy or
from inherited wealth, rather than as a reward to risk-taking, enterprise and skill acquisition and saving
(see Justino, Litchfield and  Whitehead, 2003, for a larger discussion of the difference between
functional and dysfunctional inequalities).26
residence or social status” ( Behrman,  Gaviria and  Székely, 2002: abstract). This
situation has been attributed to the minimal role the state in Latin America has played
in the economic and social life of its citizens (Gacitúa and Sojo, 2000). An increase in
this role could thus strengthen social rights and, consequently, avoid inequalities,
social exclusion and the fragmentation of citizenship due to the lack of access of some
population groups to public goods and services (Gacitúa and Sojo, 2000).
Important reasons justify the involvement of the state in the reduction of inequalities
(see Justino, 2001). One is the element of uncertainty, which arises from the public
good aspect of policies that address inequalities. Another reason is the inadequacy of
informal social protection policies against the effects of inequalities. The third is the
importance of the state in the mediation of conflicts that arise from the process of
modernisation and industrialisation, itself a cause of inequalities. Finally,
governments may also have their own distributional agenda.
Policies that address inequalities (social security, land redistribution, education and
health policies, etc) can be argued to be public goods because (i) it may be difficult to
exclude consumption from non-contributors (which leads to the know problem of
‘free-riding’), (ii) it may not be desirable, on efficiency grounds, to use prices to
govern its usage, (iii) their usage by one person does not reduce the amount that
others can consume, and (iv) they have redistributional objectives attached to them
(Arrow, 1981; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Atkinson, 1969, 1989; Barr, 1992). The
public-good aspect of those policies, allied with the failure of private insurance and
capital markets, can pose severe problems to those that suffer the most from economic
and social uncertainties. In the presence of a public good, government intervention
becomes necessary because the government can provide the appropriate incentives
and exert the necessary pressure for compulsory contribution for the provision of the
public good. This is true both in more advanced as well as poor and middle-income
economies (Justino, 2001).
The second reason is more specific to poor and middle-income countries. In  thse
countries, people are often not protected against social and economic risks (such as
variable agricultural conditions, weather variations, fluctuations in commodity prices
and so forth) caused by the normal functioning of the markets, not only because27
informational problems arise, but more importantly, because insurance and capital
markets often do not exist or, at the very least, barely function. This situation is made
worse by the persistence of economic, social and political inequalities that, in turn,
difficult social mobility. In many cases where government-provided social protection
is not in place, family- and community-based arrangements have provided some form
of social insurance against life contingencies and uncertainties. In fact, families and
communities may have better monitoring and enforcing mechanisms than other
institutions (Burgess and Stern, 1991). However, those systems entail two problems.
On the one hand, families and communities can be affected by the same risks (bad
weather conditions affect individuals and their community in the same way) and thus
they are not the ideal suppliers of insurance and socio-economic protection (Burgess
and Stern, 1991; Platteau, 1991; and Ahmad, 1991). On the other hand, traditional
forms of family and communal arrangements are disappearing as a consequence of
modernisation and increasing urbanisation (World Bank, 1994). This poses a problem
of increasing insecurity amongst people. It also contributes towards the persistence of
inequality and destitution and the impossibility of social mobility, making state
intervention of crucial importance.
State intervention can be also justified by its role as conflict manager (Justino, 2001).
As discussed extensively in Justino, Litchfield and Whitehead (2003), the process of
industrialisation and socio-economic development involves institutional changes and
market uncertainties that make some people become better-off whereas others may
become worse-off. Consequently, as argued by Hirschman (1995), “Conflicts arise
from newly emerging inequalities and sectoral or regional declines - the counterpart
precisely of various dynamic developments elsewhere in the economy” (pp. 243).
These “newly emerging inequalities” imply  a change in the relations of power
(economic, social and political), which “makes the process of development inherently
conflictual” (Chang and  Rowthorn, 1995: 41), since those that become worse-off
“may not accept the imperatives of the market and may take ‘political’ action to
redress the situation (e.g. petition, strikes, bribing, horse-trading), thereby provoking
counteraction from others in society” (Chang and Rowthorn, 1995: 41). The state is
the only possible conflict manager since it will be the only institution to possess the
means of “providing ‘governance’ which allows people to receive a ‘fair treatment’ in28
unforeseen circumstances” and thus “providing ‘insurance’ to the members of
society” (Chang and Rowthorn, 1995: 40).
In addition to the issues discussed above, governments may simply want to fulfil own
distributional and equity goals that society may want to achieve (Justino, 2001). As
Burgess and Stern (1991) argue, “whether or not markets are perfect, the government
may regard the outcomes as unattractive, unsatisfactory, or unjust from a
distributional point of view. In these circumstances, it may attempt to introduce
mechanisms for the redistribution of income, wealth, or assets” (pp. 53).
Policies  directed at the redistribution of income, wealth or assets are, however,
difficult to implement. On the one hand, some types of redistributive policies may
introduce large distortions on poor or middle-income economies and, thus, contribute
towards a further deterioration of poverty and inequality problems. For instance,
Schmidt (1995) has shown that formal social security systems in developing countries
usually lead to a redistribution of income from the poor to the middle class, rather
than the other way round. This happens because those schemes are often financed
through regressive taxation and thus the poorer fractions of the population end up
facing higher marginal rates.
On the other hand, the implementation of programmes of redistribution in developing
countries (taxation, land redistribution, social security, etc) may, furthermore, be
negatively affected by the particular social, political and economic structures – such
as the lack of sound financial systems (in particular, capital and insurance markets)
and the persistence of traditional labour structures - that characterise those countries.
Capital and insurance markets in developing countries are often incomplete or non-
existent, which limits the scope for redistribution in the form of taxation systems or
social security programmes. This problem is aggravated by budget restrictions faced
by most developing economies and by the fact that developing countries have, in
general, less government capacity to collect taxes,
16 implement complex programmes
                                                
16 While most rich countries collect taxes in excess of 30% of their domestic product, poor countries
raise in average around 17% of their domestic product in taxes (Radian, 1980: 8).29
or correct market failures, due to their low levels of income, education and
infrastructure (Radian, 1980; see also section 2.1). In addition, the implementation of
systems of redistribution in developing countries is restricted by the fragile structure
of their labour markets and by the extent of poverty in those countries. A large share
of population in developing countries is engaged in agriculture, where incomes are
very variable, productivity is low and unemployment usually means
underemployment, rather than the frictional and cyclical unemployment typically
experienced by the industrial countries ( Guhan, 1994). Consequently, systems of
taxation and social security cannot be easily implemented in developing countries. For
instance, social security (when it exists) tends to cover only workers in the
government and quasi-government sectors and workers in organised employment
(such as mining, manufacturing or plantations), where in any case the work force is
more stable, employment is more regular and a clear employer-employee nexus exits
(Justino, 2001).
17 This creates a severe unevenness in the provision of social
protection which, in turn, contributes towards the worsening of already existing socio-
economic and political inequalities (Justino, 2001).
Furthermore, as already discussed in section 2, redistributive policies may be difficult
to implement due to the interplay between political interests and economic policies.
This factor is particularly relevant in Latin America and is determined by the extent of
political inequalities in the region. Bénabou (2000) argues, using a sample of rich
countries, that participation on the electoral process is stronger amongst the higher
income groups. Thus, in regions characterised by high inequality, voters will support
lower redistribution. Capital and labour market imperfections, allied to persistent
political inequalities guarantee, thus, that low redistribution (and, consequently, high
inequality) persists across time.
Given those constraints, it is clear that implementing redistributive systems in
developing countries is not an easy task. Consequently, despite the need for
redistribution, it is not immediately clear that developing countries are able to
implement programmes of redistribution (Justino, 2002).
                                                
17 See Midgley (1984); Ahmad et al. (1991); Mouton (1975) for evidence on Africa and Mesa-Lago
(1991) for the Latin America case.30
The question is then how much is the state willing to intervene in order to reduce
dysfunctional inequalities. Most governments have in  place some form of
distributional systems governed by an array of fiscal policies. However, even if fiscal
policies are progressive, inequalities do not arise exclusively from disparities in wages
and other earnings. As discussed in the sub-section above, inequalities are determined
also by the opportunities and choices each individual faces and by forms of
discrimination inherent in society. In addition to fiscal policies, reducing inequalities
may thus also imply more pro-active state intervention in establishing equality of
initial opportunities (see Atkinson and Hills, 1998), as well as acting against forms of
discrimination that exist in all societies. In other words, redistribution should refer not
only to the redistribution of incomes, wealth and assets but also to the guarantee of
equal choices and the redistribution of social and political rights. This would define a









In the first instance, governments would establish progressive tax systems, whereby
income gets transferred from the rich to the poor. The second tier involves an active
role of the state in the promotion of equal opportunities by, for instance, implementing
universal primary and secondary schooling and universal access to primary health31
care and social security benefits.  Finally, governments must also counteract
discrimination in all areas of society by ( i) guaranteeing equal access to job
opportunities by all groups in the population (women and men, individuals of
different cultural backgrounds, etc); (ii) protecting cultural differences, the right to use
different languages, different ways of living and different artistic expressions and (iii)
establishing equal rights of access to economic, social, political and legal institutions
by discriminated groups - for instance, indigenous people and African descendants in
Latin America – and the rest of the population. Whether these three pillars are
implemented in stages or simultaneously, inequalities will only be effectively reduced
in a sustainable fashion once the three types of policies are in place (Justino, 2003).
This argument is clearly illustrated by the case studies of Brazil and Peru analysed in
section 2.  In Brazil, although the implementation of more progressive systems of
taxation can help reduce inequalities, these could be further strengthened by an
increase in government expenditure on education and health care and, in particular, by
the implementation of policies aimed at improving the quality of social institutions
used by the poor. Alongside these two strategies, the Brazilian government cannot
overlook the fact that inequality across all states has a strong racial component.
Effective anti-discrimination policies must thus be put in place if the government in
Brazil is seriously committed to the reduction of economic, social and political
inequalities. Similarly to Brazil’s, the example of Peru underlines the importance of
the three-tier process discussed above. In this case, even if progressive systems of
taxation and equal initial opportunities were in place, these would not be sufficiently
effective until substantial policies against the discrimination of indigenous
populations are implemented.
The guarantee of equal choices and opportunities and the redistribution of social and
political rights are likely to face similar types of opposition as the redistribution of
incomes, wealth and assets, both at the economic and political level. The lack of
capital and insurance markets and the extent of budget restrictions will hinder the
possibility of higher levels and better targeting systems of education and heal
expenditure. In addition, the persistence of traditional labour structures will impede a
change in social attitudes crucial to the reduction – and elimination – of
discrimination and forms of segregation, not only in the labour market but in all areas32
of society. Finally, policies that guarantee more equal opportunities and a more equal
distribution of social and political rights  are also likely to face opposition from
established elites as such policies will be perceived as a direct challenge to their
economic and political influence.
The redistribution of financial resources and social and political rights require thus
political determination on the part of the government (which in many circumstances is
absent as governments in Latin America are often subject to the pressure of interest
groups or have different agendas), as well as the support of elites and a change of
social attitudes. It requires also increased demand from the general population for
redistribution and a more active participation of the civil society in holding the
various governments to account on all issues related to redistribution and lobbying for
the three types of intervention suggested above.
The importance of redistribution – whether of incomes or social and political rights -
in poor economies and middle-income countries must not be dismissed. In the
philosophical literature, a pure version of egalitarian society has not always been
defended even though there are strong calls for redistribution (Rawls, 1971; Nagel,
1979; Parfit, 1991; Scanlon, 1996; Nussbaum 2000). Rawls (1971) has argued that
there is no inherent reason to think that an egalitarian situation is the most desired
outcome for the worse off. His view is that if the absolute level of well-being of the
worse off is higher in an unequal society than an equal society, then the unequal
society is more desirable. Redistribution is, however, in general desirable because it
relieves suffering and severe deprivation and assures the existence of equal
opportunities. Those who are truly badly-off can thus be helped through a transfer of
social, economic and political resources from those who are better-off. Although there
may some loss of well-being involved in the process of redistribution, this loss must
be weighted against how much gain is granted to the less well-off.33
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper discussed the multidimensionality of the concept of inequality and
analysed the processes that explain the emergence and persistence of inequalities.
Latin American countries not only have some of the highest levels of income
inequality in the world, but are also characterised by severe inequalities in the labour
market, in the access to health, education and social security services and in the access
to political and legal institutions. Some of the most serious inequalities registered in
Latin America take place along racial and ethnic divides, as well as regional and
rural/urban dimensions. As illustrated by the two case studies analysed in the paper,
Brazil and Peru, ethnic minority groups, African descendants and rural populations in
general often find themselves at the bottom of economic, social and political
distributions of assets and rights. This is a particularly troubling characteristic of the
inequality processes in Latin America, as it is likely to impede the successful
implementation of policies aimed at reducing income inequalities.
In face of this situation, we argued for the need to implement a three-tier system of
policies in Latin American countries committed at effectively reducing inequality.
This system would encompass (i) the establishment of progressive tax systems, (ii) the
promotion of equal opportunities, and (iii) the reduction of discrimination in all areas
of society. The implementation of such integrated system would differ from country
to country since the types and dimensions of inequality vary significantly across the
Latin America region. However, we believe that only some combination of these three
types of policies can effectively reduce inequality in Latin America in a sustainable
and permanent fashion.
This paper argues therefore for the need of further studies on the three problem areas
identified above –  progressivity of tax systems, the extent of inequality in initial
opportunities and discrimination – in individual Latin America countries in order to
allow for a more meaningful discussion on the type of programmes to be
implemented. Furthermore, improvements in data  collection, particularly
disaggregated inequality data across economic, social and political types and regional,
location and group dimensions are also of crucial importance if these studies are to
take place.34
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